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Abstract 
In 2015, the Heads of State and Government of COMESA, the EAC and SADC agreed to establish 
the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) extending from Cape to Cairo, encompassing all twenty-six 
members of the three groupings. While the TFTA negotiations are ongoing, it is necessary that 
member states are aware of their rights and obligations as well as the nature and power of the organs 
of the TFTA. This paper analyses dispute resolution bodies of the three regional economic 
communities making up the large trade bloc, in order to distil the most salient features which allow for 
effective dispute resolution. The study shows that it is necessary that regional judiciaries be allowed 
to operate independently and efficiently without undue interference from political elites, otherwise they 
stand to fail in executing their mandate.  
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II INTRODUCTION 
 
Regional integration refers to the outcome of processes, including cooperative 
arrangements, the implementation of intergovernmental treaties and market-led 
processes, through which economies of countries in a region become more closely 
interconnected.1 These outcomes are essential to building markets, creating robust 
and diverse economies, increasing opportunities for growth, and attracting new 
sources of investment finance.  Regional integration allows for economies of scale, 
promotes intra-regional trade and ensures that regional bodies have a greater role in 
global economic governance. If well and truly grounded in the socio-economic 
realities in which member states operate, regional integration is more likely to 
succeed and enhance the trade liberalisation agenda.2 However, it can pose serious 
dangers, especially given the multiple membership regional integration models 
prevailing at present. These multiple commitments can also lead to jurisdictional 
conflict and non-compliance. 
‘The presence of multiple regional courts with overlapping functions and 
jurisdiction may by itself defeat the whole purpose of establishing the 
respective regional organisations as economic zones to spearhead and 
accelerate the growth and economy of the people. It is not an incentive 
to foreign investors, who prefer certainty and predictability of decisions 
in the event a dispute emerges calling for judicial intervention. In this 
kind of situation there is no certainty or predictability, especially given 
                                                     
1
 African Development Bank Group (ADB Group), “Regional Integration”, 
http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/topics/regional-integration/ (Accessed 26.02.2015). 
2
 Donald A Calvert ‘How the Multilateral Trade System Under the World Trade Organisation is 
Attempting to Reconcile the Contradictions & Hurdles Posed by Regional Trade Agreements: An 
Analysis of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade’ (Unpublished Masters Thesis, 
George Mason University, 2002). 
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that one is not even sure of which court one should go to if a dispute 
arises.’3 
The overriding role of dispute settlement bodies in regional integration initiatives is to 
foster predictability, transparency, accountability and participation of all member 
states as well as individuals conducting business in them. Sound governance and 
remedial measures are necessary for regional integration and development. Clarity 
around trade rules breeds a culture of trust which in turn facilitates greater trade; 
while the availability of a platform to protect the rights of investors creates 
opportunities for further investment.  
This paper consists of five parts. The first section introduces the subject of regional 
integration at the multilateral and examines why countries establish regional 
economic communities. In essence, it details the arrangements that lead to the 
formation of these agreements and how this impacts on global trade relations. Part 
two continues in the vein of background material through a discussion of the African 
Economic Community (AEC) and how it is to be achieved before zooming in on the 
formation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). It principally lays the contextual 
basis for the establishment of the TFTA within the broader debate of the 
establishment of the AEC. The third unit provides an assessment of the problems 
and prospects faced by regional economic communities in their attempts to address 
disputes at the regional level. It raises pertinent issues affecting the manner in which 
disputes can be resolved. Part four draws attention to the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of COMESA, SADC and the EAC, as well as that of the soon to be 
established Tripartite Dispute Settlement Body. The aim is to draw out the salient 
                                                     
3
 John Eudes Ruhangisa ‘The East African Court of Justice” in Rok Ajulu The Making of a Region: 
The Revival of the East African Community (2005) 107. 
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features of dispute settlement in these communities to inform future trade dispute 
settlement measures. Finally, the fifth section consolidates the points raised and 
uses them as a basis for providing concrete recommendations for the TFTA dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
III THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AND REGIONALISM 
 
(a) WTO Rules on Regional Integration 
The legal provisions which regulate the formation and subsistence of regional trade 
agreements lie in a number of WTO Agreements: the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT); the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and the 
Agreement on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and the 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause). Article XXIV of 
the GATT sets out how RTAs should operate. There are three major obligations in 
this regard: both internal and external trade requirements as well as a notification 
responsibility. In order for an RTA to pass WTO muster, it should seek to reduce 
substantially all barriers to trade amongst its members.4 Barriers to trade in respect 
of non-RTA members who are also WTO members must not be more restrictive than 
those obtaining prior to the conclusion of the RTA.5The WTO has to be notified of the 
intention to create an RTA, subject to review by the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA).6  
The Enabling Clause provides for special and differential treatment for developing 
countries as long as the notification procedure is followed. In addition, no added 
                                                     
4
 Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994. 
5
 Article XXIV:5 of the GATT 1994. 
6
 Article XXIV:7 of the GATT 1994. 
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barriers to trade should be created following such treatment. With respect to trade in 
services, Article V of the GATS provides for essentially the same requirements as 
obtain under GATT Article XXIV. However, arguments have been raised to the effect 
that the GATS is more lenient in its regional integration requirements than the 
GATT.7 While it is useful to have these arrangements in place, they are not without 
their faults. The CRTA has never come to a consensus regarding the compliance of 
any RTA which it has been asked to take notice of.8 In addition, the notification 
procedure does not seem to be working well. For instance, the Tripartite Free Trade 
Area is under negotiation in Africa, yet no notification procedures have as yet been 
implemented. Members often notify the CRTA after the formation of the RTA or 
choose not to make a notification at all.9 This limits the formation of RTAs in that the 
procedure is only effective insofar as states choose to comply. However, attempts 
have been made to improve the rules pertaining to regional trade agreements.10 
Nevertheless, the prescriptions described above are useful in delineating the limits 
within which an RTA will be recognised. Despite its shortcomings, the monitoring and 
compliance mechanism offered by the CRTA is necessary in reigning in rogue 
elements in the multilateral trading system.  
                                                     
7
 See Petros Constantinos Mavroidis ‘Do Not Ask Too Many Questions: The Institutional 
Arrangements for Accommodating Regional Integration Within the WTO’ in E Kwan Choi and James 
C Hartigan (eds.) Handbook of International Trade (2004) for a more detailed discussion. 
8
 Joanna Langille ‘Neither Constitution Nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by Examining the Legal 
Limits on Contracting Out Through Regional Trade Agreements’ (2011) 86 NYU Law Review 1482 at 
1506. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 William J Davey and Andre Sapir ‘The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements’ 
(2009) 8 World Trade Review 5-23 at 20.  The 1994 Understanding on the Interpretation of GATT 
Article XXIV gave power to the Dispute Settlement Body to review the consistency of preferential 
agreements with the WTO. In addition, the General Council Decision on the Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements prescribed that RTA parties furnish the CRTA with 
detailed information to allow for greater transparency. 
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According to the WTO, 349 RTAs have been notified to the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements.11Of these, 206 were notified in terms of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994, 107 under GATS Article V and the remainder - 36 - under the Enabling 
Clause. However, there are many more RTAs that are in existence at present than 
those which have been notified to the WTO. The WTO itself admits that there are 
almost 500 RTAs in existence worldwide.12 Each WTO member is a party to at least 
one RTA.13 Both developed and developing country members of the WTO are party 
to RTAs, signifying that the motivation for entering into these agreements is rather 
complex.  
(b) Why Regional Integration? 
Countries choose to engage in regional trade forums because it is easier to reach 
agreement on concessions at a micro rather than a macro level. There are less 
chances of reaching deadlock in a smaller grouping than in a larger one where 
divergent interests compete for airplay in a small space.14 In addition, many 
developing countries are unhappy with the progress of trade negotiations in the 
WTO, especially in light of the deadlock reached in the Doha Round. Ismail notes 
that the GATT failed developing countries through the defensive role of developed 
countries.15 Developed countries are pushing for deeper trade and investment 
commitments from developing countries than is now possible given the divisions in 
the WTO. Thus by engaging in RTA negotiation and formation, developing countries 
are better empowered to tap into developed country markets. However, a secondary 
                                                     
11
 WTO Secretariat ‘Regional Trade Agreements Information System’ last accessed from 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx on 16 August 2015. 
12
  WTO ‘Secretariat Facts and Figures’ last accessed from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm on 16 August 2015. 
13
  WTO ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ op cit. 
14
 Ildiko Virag-Neumann ‘Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO’ 7
th
 International Conference on 
Management, Enterprise and Benchmarking, June 5-6 2009, Budapest, Hungary 385. 
15
 Faizel Ismail Reforming the World Trade Organisation: Developing Countries in the Doha Round 
(2009) 12. 
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reason for developing country participation in these arrangements may be the need 
to move away from a developed country dominated multilateral trading system to 
one in which they have a multi-polar trade regime. 
Initially, the WTO encouraged the formation of RTAs because it was envisaged that 
they would be useful building blocks for the multilateral trading system. This is 
evident in the fact that free trade areas and customs unions were sanctioned since 
the formation of the GATT in 1947. The provisions of the GATT 1947 relating to 
RTAs were imported into the GATT 1994. Customs unions were deemed to be 
similar to single countries in trade negotiations as they maintained a common 
external tariff against non-members.16 However, questions began to arise relating to 
whether RTAs created or diverted trade.  
Trade creation involves the generation of gains when consumers are able to 
purchase from the cheapest and most competitive source of supply. This occurs 
when RTA members switch from inefficient domestic producers and import from 
more efficient producers from other members of the RTA.17 Conversely, trade 
diversion occurs when members switch imports from low-cost production in the 
multilateral system and import more from higher-cost producers in the partner 
countries.18 This in turn means that there are fewer welfare gains from regional 
trade. Although trade diversion may occur after the formation of an RTA, the fact that 
states are continually signing these agreements is testimony to their commitment to 
liberalising trade, albeit at a smaller scale. Trade diversion and trade creation can 
operate within the same regional framework, however, the net effect when the two 
                                                     
16
 Michael J Trebilcock Understanding Trade Law (2011) 44. 
17
 Pal, P ‘Regional Trade Agreements in a Multilateral Trade Regime: An Overview’ (2004) 2 last 
accessed from http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/may2004/survey_paper_RTA.pdf on 16 August 
2015. 
18
 Ibid. 
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are balanced is what will signify whether the regional trade agreement is successful 
or not.  
IV AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
(a) The African Economic Community 
The African regional economic integration debate stems from the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity in 1963.19 The Lagos Plan of Action concluded 
following a 1980 Summit visualised as a blueprint for the economic and political 
development of Africa.20 African statesmen envisaged the formation an African 
Economic Community (AEC). A treaty for the establishment of the AEC was signed 
in 1991.21 The Abuja Treaty was an improvement on the Lagos Plan of Action in that 
it was more specific regarding economic, social and cultural development in Africa. 
The treaty aimed at the linear progression of the AEC based on existing regional 
arrangements to an Africa-wide economic bloc.22 In 2002, the African Union (AU) 
replaced the OAU, with the commitment to regional integration being iterated in the 
new treaty.23 This led to the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), but it still hinged on development and economic integration 
at a sub-regional level.  
                                                     
19
 Formed following the independence of African states from their colonial rulers to spearhead 
development and the African Renaissance. See generally Henry Kyambalesa and Mathurin C 
Houngnikpo Economic Integration and Development in Africa (2006). 
20
 Victor AO Adetula ‘Regional integration in Africa: Prospect for Closer Cooperation Between West, 
East and Southern Africa’ (2004) Paper presented at the meeting of IDASA/FREDSKORPSET 
Research Exchange Programme – Governance and Democracy, Johannesburg 11-12. 
21
 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991, also known as the Abuja Treaty. 
22
 The treaty foresaw regional integration progressing in six stages: the strengthening of existing 
regional arrangements; tariff liberalisation and phasing out of non-tariff barriers regionally; the 
formation of free trade areas and customs unions; tariff liberalisation amongst the regional groupings; 
the formation of a monetary union; and eventually the formation of the African Economic Community.  
23
 Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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Discussions on regional economic integration in Africa tend to focus more on issues 
around the value-add in combining economic might within the region, to the 
detriment of the legal issues ensuing there from.24 Even more glaring in the 
omissions is the “after thought” accorded to dispute settlement, both within the 
region itself, and at the level of the disjuncture between regional and national 
systems of law in relation to trade. Furthermore, while regional trade agreements are 
established in terms of the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), there is 
sometimes a gap between the two legal systems. It is important therefore that 
regional trade agreements adhere to the law of the WTO, which, while imperfect, 
provides a standard according to which decisions can be made and enforced. 
While deliberations on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)25 were preceded by the 
AEC Treaty and NEPAD, the TFTA will feed into the broader African regional 
integration agenda, since it is one of the blocks through which full African integration 
will be achieved. The idea is to use the TFTA coalition as a springboard from which 
full regional integration will ensue. It envisages a progression along the lines of that 
of the European Union from free trade area to customs union then common market 
and eventually monetary and political integration. Nevertheless, given the recent 
challenges experienced in the Eurozone as well as the slow progress in 
implementing existing integration initiatives on the continent, it is time to reassess 
the best way forward and define the “African way” of integration.26  African leaders 
need to move away from abstract and grandiose notions to more pragmatic solutions 
to the integration conundrum. We should not ignore the lessons learnt from the 
                                                     
24
 Richard F Oppong Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa (2011) 12. 
25
 Proposed amalgamation of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
26
 The WTO has noted that African countries are lagging behind in terms of effective regional 
integration models – WTO The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to 
Coherence (2011). 
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“European” and “ASEAN” ways, for example, but it is critical that the approach of the 
continent reflects the realities of economic development and the global economy.27 
This is why it then becomes necessary to also include the development of an 
appropriate trade dispute resolution mechanism based on what works for Africa.  
 
(b) The Tripartite Free Trade Area 
In 2008, Heads of State and Government of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) agreed to establish a free trade area 
extending from Cape to Cairo and encompassing all twenty six members of the three 
groupings. A Draft Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement was finalised in 
December 2010.28 TFTA negotiations commenced at a Summit held in South Africa 
in June 2011. The objectives of the TFTA as stated at the first COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite Summit in October 2008 are to: promote trade in the region through 
creation of a wider market; increase inter-REC and extra-REC investment flows; 
enhance competitiveness of the region in the globalised environment due to 
improved production improve efficiency and value addition; develop cross-regional 
infrastructure; develop inter-REC financial and capital systems which will deepen 
financial intermediation; and strengthen the region’s negotiating positions in 
multilateral and bilateral trade arrangements.29  
                                                     
27
 Catherine Grant and Clarence Siziba ‘African Leaders Commit to Better Trade Relations’ (2012) 
last accessed from http://www.thetradebeat.com/authors/catherine-grant-makokera/item/36-african-
leaders-commit-to-better-trade-relations on 16 August 2015. 
28
 Draft Agreement Establishing the COMESA-EAC-SADC Free Trade Area (2010) last accessed 
from http://www.tralac.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/Draft_Tripartite_FTA_Agreement_Revised_Dec_2010.pdf  on 
16 August 2015. 
29
 Article 4 of the Draft TFTA Agreement.  
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Essentially, this means that the proponents of the TFTA envision a development 
through trade outcome. This is not much different from the vision of African 
statesmen since the inception of the OAU, however, at present, the discussion had 
been enlarged to include greater competitiveness for the region as well as a better 
negotiating position. The overarching goal of the three regional organisations is to 
expand trade, alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life of the population of the 
Member States. The TFTA is also an effort to rationalise the problem of overlapping 
memberships of the RECs in the region. COMESA has 19 Member States of which 
eight are also members of SADC and four of the EAC; the EAC has five members, 
with four being members of COMESA and one a member of SADC; and lastly, 
SADC has 15 members, eight of which belong to COMESA as well and one to the 
EAC.30  
 
The TFTA negotiations were launched on 12 June 2011 at the Second Tripartite 
Summit.  The Tripartite process will adopt a three-pronged approach based on 
market integration in the TFTA, infrastructure development and industrial 
development.31 The negotiations are to take place in two phases: (i) trade in goods 
and (ii) the free movement of business persons in two separate but parallel tracks; 
followed by (ii) services, intellectual property rights, competition policy and trade-
related areas.32 Even as the negotiating agenda may be laudable, it is disheartening 
to note that the negotiating strategy is not being pushed at REC level, but rather at 
                                                     
30
 COMESA Members: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe; EAC Members: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda; SADC Members: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe (Madagascar currently suspended). 
31
 COMESA, EAC and SADC Communiqué of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, 
12 June 2011, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
32
 COMESA, EAC and SADC, Declaration Launching the Negotiations for the Establishment of the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area, 12 June 2011. 
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the individual country plane. The TFTA Agreement was signed on June 10 2015.  
While negotiations as to the meat of the AGrement are ongoing, it is necessary to 
look at the implications that its establishment has on trade relations not only among 
member states, but also between the proposed block and external partners. 
Granted, the Draft Agreement is merely “a draft”, however, negotiations are moving 
forward based on its contents and it is likely to form a huge bulk of the final 
agreement upon signature at a future date.33  
What states undertake to do in terms of the Agreement should be enforceable. ‘A 
rules-based regime provides certainty, predictability and transparency for regional 
trade and investment.’34 The TFTA is a rules-based initiative in that it is established 
in terms of GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause. Twenty of the twenty-six 
states involved in the formulation of the TFTA are also members of the WTO,35 
hence such compliance is required. States are better able to pursue their obligations 
where there is clarity in terms of rules of engagement. This is not to say that political 
will is not important in state relations, however, at the most basic level of state 
interaction, lucid regulations assist in state practice.  
Effective dispute resolution and implementation of decisions will aid in this process. 
Indeed, former Director General of the WTO, Michael Moore, said that ‘dispute 
settlement is the backbone of a multilateral trading system’.36 With a dispute 
settlement mechanism, the commitments that states make in trade agreements are 
                                                     
33
 Article 50 of the Draft Tripartite Agreement provides that the Agreement shall come into effect upon 
ratification by two thirds of the members the trading bloc. 
34
 T Hartzenberg ‘Introduction’ in Trudi Hartzenberg et al Cape to Cairo: Making the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area Work (2011) iii. 
35
 Ethiopia, Comoros, Sudan, Libya, Seychelles and Eritrea are not members yet. Of the 6 non-
members, 5 have Observer status at the WTO. The first three have already started accession 
negotiations. 
36
 Quoted by Amos Saurombe ‘Regional Integration  Agenda  for  SADC “ Caught  in the  Winds  of  
Change”: Problems  and Prospects’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 103. 
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ascribed even more practical value. Trade dispute settlement in Africa has not 
received as much airplay as it should. In fact, in some jurisdictions, trade disputes 
have not been heard. This is in spite of the existence of trade dispute resolution 
mechanisms within the three regional economic communities (RECS). For a variety 
of reasons, member states in the three RECS clearly need to improve their 
commitment to a rules-based regional integration agenda. Integration not only 
relates to the benefits stemming from the alliance, but also the practical reality 
around issues of compliance and the enforcement of agreements.  
V PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
(a) Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution 
The fact that the TFTA is a rules-based agglomeration is advantageous in that it is 
clear what members ought to adhere to in terms of their rights and obligations. Just 
as the WTO system is plain in its trade liberalisation and non-discrimination ethos, 
clear rules will allow member states to conduct themselves according to the dictates 
of the TFTA Agreement.37 This is also useful given the fact that while states are in 
principle equal in international law, the reality is something different altogether. A 
rules-based approach allows even weaker states to experience somewhat the same 
equality and participation at the multilateral level.38 
An institution designed for the resolution of disputes must subsist for there to be a 
practical dimension to the dispute settlement understanding. It is not enough to have 
rules without an adjudication process separate from the day to day operation of an 
                                                     
37
 The trade liberalisation agenda of the WTO rests on the standard of non-discrimination, which is 
amplified in two principles: most-favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) – Articles I and III 
of the GATT. 
38
 Gerhard Erasmus ‘The Tripartite FTA: Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in Trudi 
Hartzenberg et al Cape to Cairo: Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area Work (2011) 86. 
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organisation. An independent judicial arm will ensure that states comply with the 
mandate of the organisation.39 Rules of procedure are also very important as they 
will determine the adjudication of disputes and how decisions will be implemented. 
The manner in which disputes are resolved is also instrumental in the determination 
of the effectiveness of a dispute resolution mechanism. Under the GATT, 
consultations and diplomatic efforts were used to resolve disputes.40  In the WTO, 
the dispute settlement mechanism outlines powers, procedures and outcomes in the 
realm of trade dispute resolution.41 There are 4 major steps in the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure : consultation, panel proceedings, appellate review and 
implementation and enforcement.42 This system envisages the settlement of 
disputes as between parties. Only at such point as they fail to do so will a Panel be 
established. Decisions under the GATT were reached via consensus; where there 
was no consensus, there could be no resolution. At the WTO, the Panel Report is 
adopted through the reverse consensus method; this means that the Report will be 
adopted should there be no consensus against its adoption.43 This method is useful 
in ensuring that decisions are reached expeditiously.  
Finally, the enforcement of rulings is probably the most important element of the 
dispute settlement conundrum. Rules and legal action do not accomplish much 
without the implementation of decisions. Indeed, for the rules to be deemed to have 
                                                     
39
 FB William Kelly ‘An Independent Judiciary: The Core of the Rule of Law’ International Centre for 
Criminal Justice Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Vancouver, Canada last accessed from 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/An_Independant_Judiciary.pdf on 16 August 2015. 
40
Erasmus ‘The Tripartite FTA’ at 88-89. 
41
 Annex 2 - Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, also 
known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
42
 Jeanne J. Grimmett ‘Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: An Overview’ CRS 
Report for Congress, September 14 2006 last accessed from 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74910.pdf on 16 August 2015. 
43
 Erasmus ‘The Tripartite FTA’ op cit. See also Bruce Wilson ‘Compliance by WTO Members with 
Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date’ (2007) 10 Journal of International 
Economic Law 397-403. 
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an effect and acquire the respect and recognition they deserve, enforcement should 
be seen to not only be possible, but also effective.44  
The WTO dispute settlement system may not be the best, however, it is certainly the 
most instructive when it comes to the resolution of disputes in the area of 
international trade.45 It is not a standard according to which all other trade dispute 
settlement bodies should function, but rather a useful springboard from which the 
debate on trade dispute settlement at the regional level can be launched.  
(b) Challenges Faced by the RECs 
The question of increased markets through regional integration has always been 
high on the agenda of the three RECs.  This is primarily because of the low levels of 
industrialisation that result in countries trading in primary or simple manufactured 
products, asymmetric product complementarities in the region, and the small 
populations in many countries. The question of expanded and new markets in the 
wake of the TFTA is also challenged by the low levels of intra-REC trade. There are 
reports of SADC and the EAC showing the highest levels of intra-REC trade in 
Africa46 but the nature of that trade has to be taken into consideration. Economic 
polarisation is a real threat with South Africa, Kenya and Egypt in a likely position to 
reap most benefits from the TFTA as they currently have a high trade surplus with 
other countries in the region.   
                                                     
44
 Wilson  ‘Compliance by WTO Members’ op cit. 
45
 Surya P Subedi ‘WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a New Technique for Settling Disputes in 
International Law’ in Duncan French, Matthew Saul, Nigel D. White (eds.) International Law and 
Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (2010). Subedi points out that critics argue that 
this system is ineffective insofar as monitoring compliance of great powers is concerned.  
46
 African Union, “Trade Liberalisation, Investment and Economic Integration in African Regional 
Economic Communities Towards the African Common Market and Economic Community” AU 
Conference of Ministers of Trade, 6
th
 Ordinary Session, 29
th
 October – November 2010, Kigali, 
Rwanda. 
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There is also the challenge of protectionist trade regimes in the region and the over-
dependence on customs revenue. Tariffs contribute 30% of the total central 
government recurrent revenue in Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe and 40% in 
Comoros, Mauritius and Zambia.47 These countries may feel pressured to keep their 
import tariffs high in order to protect their revenue sources. The TFTA demands that 
countries either expand their effective tax bases or find alternative revenue sources, 
especially in circumstances where there might be a contraction of previously 
protected industries due to the TFTA.48  However, this impact may be fairly limited 
given the low levels of intra-regional trade and the existing preferential tariff 
arrangements under bilateral agreements and REC FTAs. 
The TFTA also seeks to eliminate the problem of overlapping membership of RECs 
and the multiplicity of trading arrangements. There will be difficulties due to the 
different levels of integration of COMESA’s 19 members, 14 are trading at a FTA 
level while three are still trading under the Preferential Trading Area (PTA). Despite 
the launch of the COMESA Customs Union (CU) in 2010, it is yet to be implemented. 
SADC has 15 members (including Madagascar which is currently suspended), it 
launched its FTA in 2008, and 12 are implementing the FTA while three are not yet 
doing so.49  
The biggest challenge comes from the countries that are not part of any trading 
arrangement in the region,50 but there is also the issue of CUs versus FTA 
arrangements. Where, for instance, the EAC might be charging high tariffs on 
                                                     
47
 Bohela Lunogelo & AV Mbilinyi, ‘Convergence of Comesa-SADC-EAC Regional Frameworks’, The 
Economic and Social Research Foundation. Paper presented at the Annual Forum for Private, Public 
and Academia Partnership on Trade Policy and Negotiations organised by the Ministry of Industry, 
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external imports, COMESA and SADC are apparently in support of free trade with 
countries outside their regions.51 Problems which may rise between states include 
access to markets through what Braude calls ‘membership back doors.’52 This can 
occur, for instance, through the dumping of Egyptian products in Uganda through 
Kenya. Similarly, problems could arise with products from South Africa entering the 
EAC through Tanzania. These are issues that would need to be addressed at the 
negotiating stage to ensure that these ‘membership back doors’ are not used to the 
detriment of other trade partners. 
Moreover, the negotiation of trading arrangements with MERCOSUR and other 
external parties also poses a threat to the TFTA.53 This is particularly with regard to 
the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the EU.54 These have 
revealed massive holes in the unity of the RECs with countries failing to harmonise 
positions when dealing with the EU, hence resulting in a patchwork of potential EPA 
agreements. 
Limited human and financial capacity still plagues the RECs as well as their 
members.  The negotiating capacity of member states, in terms both of skills and 
manpower, is limited: there are thin staff complements at the REC Secretariats, and 
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limited funds for research and analyses in preparation for the negotiations.55  There 
are also the financial demands associated with the creation of the TFTA, such the 
cost of providing the necessary infrastructure to facilitate trade and compensatory 
and adjustment costs for those Member States that will be adversely affected.56 
These issues have not been canvassed by the RECs to date and may pose 
problems in the future if not properly addressed. 
While there seems to be substantial support and enthusiasm for the TFTA across the 
wider region, political will and commitment to its implementation is a different issue. 
This problem has long manifested itself in the individual RECs, and is mostly 
attributed to the unwillingness by African states to cede any amount of sovereignty to 
a regional entity and to the prioritisation of domestic interests over regional ones.57 
The rhetoric of political will in favour of integration has not been sufficiently met with 
the requisite action.  
In the preparations for the TFTA, it has been reported that countries have been 
missing meetings and have also been late in submitting their responses to 
documents.58  It is likely that the issue of tariff liberalisation will also meet with some 
resistance from domestic constituencies, particularly in protected industries, and this 
will have significant impact on the commitment to liberalise. Coupled with the issue 
of political will and commitment in general is that of political instability in the region - 
a factor which TFTA Member States will have to contend with as it affects trade. 
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Zimbabwe is a good example while Malawi is also going through some significant 
political upheavals. Both countries have sought derogations from their SADC FTA 
commitments.59  
The EAC is part of the Great Lakes Region, which is prone to conflict. It is thus 
necessary to explore the nexus between trade and security to ensure that as 
markets open up with the TFTA initiative; trade benefits are not lost to criminal 
activities.60 If criminal activities are not protected against, there could be serious 
repercussions for the viability of the T-FTA which could indeed result in regional 
instability and be detrimental to regional trade. Sea-borne trade is still very important 
to Africa, yet East Africa is battling with piracy (COST). Such disruptions to trade 
could lead to disputes arising between states regarding the movement of people 
(refugees and economic immigrants), border issues and greater trade facilitation 
costs in certain countries compared to others, to the detriment of the TFTA.  
In the move towards merging the three RECs, institutional harmonisation will be a 
challenge, particularly as the current strategy on trade liberalisation leaves the RECs 
free to pursue their integration agendas undisturbed. A merger would entail 
dissolution (at least in part) of the three RECs in favour of a new expanded one. If 
this is still to happen, the approach has to be structured to make the process easier 
when it is time.61 A merger will entail a very extensive harmonisation programme, 
particularly given the different legal and institutional regimes subsisting in each REC. 
                                                     
59
 Staff Reporter ‘Focus on the Tricks of Trade, Hears SADC’ Mail & Guardian 10 September 2011 
last accessed from http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-10-focus-on-the-tricks-of-trade-centre-tells-sadc on 
16 August 2015. 
60
 Ruhangisa op cit at 101. 
61
 An instructive discussion on harmonisation of laws is detailed by Polina Dlagnekova ‘The Need to 
Harmonise Trade-Related Laws Within Countries of the African Union: An Introduction to the 
Problems Posed by Legal Divergence’ Paper prepared for the Southern African Society of Legal 
20 
 
VI DISPUTE RESOLUTION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
(a) The COMESA Court of Justice 
The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), established in 
1981, became COMESA in 1993 in line with Article 29 of the PTA itself which called 
for the development of the PTA into a common market and eventually into an 
economic community.62 COMESA was established primarily as a vehicle for trade 
and economic development, and its objectives are economically orientated.63 It is 
interesting to note that one of the key objectives is to contribute towards the 
establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic 
Community.64 Evidently, the overall integration strategy of the AEC is important to 
COMESA members.  
The COMESA Court of Justice (CoJ) which is composed of seven judges appointed 
by the Authority, and whose function is to ensure adherence to law in the 
interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty as well as to adjudicate upon 
all matters referred to it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty. Article 19 tasks the CoJ 
with the interpretation and application of treaty law; exclusive jurisdiction over 
matters arising in and out of the COMESA Treaty is granted to the court.65 In 
addition, the court has jurisdiction to give Advisory Opinions regarding questions of 
law relating to the Treaty.66 Disputes between COMESA employees and the 
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Authority may also be heard by the court.67 All judgements of the CoJ are final and 
conclusive and not open to appeal.68 Decisions of the court have precedence over 
those of national courts of Member states.69The seat of the CoJ is in Khartoum, 
Sudan. Seven judges appointed by the COMESA Authority based on their 
qualifications as distinguished judicial officers in their national courts comprise the 
court.70 They are appointed for a period of 5 years, which period is renewable for a 
second term.71 
Both the COMESA and EAC Courts provide for arbitration where commercial 
disputes have arisen.72 Arbitration allows disputes to be resolved without resorting to 
litigation, which is expensive and time-consuming. By contrast, SADC, and presently, 
the TFTA Agreement do not allow individuals to directly access the court for 
redress.73 This could pose major problems for the application of treaty law between 
the RECS as they come together in the TFTA.  
According to Article 23 of the DSU, the DSB has exclusive jurisdiction over any 
disputes arising from the WTO covered agreements.74 At the WTO, only states may 
bring disputes for adjudication by the DSB; individuals do not have the same 
privilege. However, at the regional level, individuals may approach international 
tribunals for redress.75 Individuals may not always be able to lobby their 
governments to institute proceedings against violating states, hence giving private 
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parties standing before regional courts allows for greater justice to be served. Given 
the fact that Africa has a large informal business sector, allowing individuals to 
approach the tribunals for the redress of international trade disputes would be a 
positive step. It would be ideal as well to incorporate the exhaustion of local 
remedies in the TFTA prior to instituting proceedings at the regional level.  
In Eastern and Southern African Trade Bank v Ogang76an employee of the PTA 
Bank sought an order suspending a decision of the bank’s board of directors. The 
bank claimed that the court had no jurisdiction over it on the basis that it was an 
independent institution, not an organ of COMESA. The court rejected this argument, 
citing the fact that the bank was created under the auspices of Article 174 of the 
COMESA Treaty, meaning that it was indeed an organ of COMESA. This case has 
two-fold significance: it affirmed the right of individuals to appear before the court 
and highlighted that the CoJ is also charged with oversight of relational issues 
relating to the structure and functions of all Treaty organs. 
(b) The East African Court of Justice 
Trade and economic integration in the EAC can be traced as far back as the colonial 
era.77 In 1917 Kenya and Uganda entered into a Customs Union which was joined by 
the then Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1927 and together they formed the East 
African Community in 1967. This EAC was dissolved in 1977 owing to trade 
polarisation effects arising from the economic dominance of Kenya and the ‘political, 
ideological and personal differences between the respective leaders’.78  The current 
EAC was established in 1999 through the signing of the Treaty for the Establishment 
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of the East African Community. The EAC’s agenda on integration goes beyond 
economic integration to incorporate political integration.79 The economic integration 
agenda has been aggressively pursued and the EAC is unusual in that it chose to 
start its integration with a customs union rather than a free trade area.  
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was established in terms of the Treaty 
Establishing the East African Community.80  Like the CoJ, the court is charged with 
the interpretation and application of EAC Treaty Law.81 Exclusive jurisdiction over 
matters arising in and out of the EAC Treaty is granted to the EACJ.82Decisions of 
the court are final, binding and conclusive and not open to appeal.83 Fifteen judges 
are appointed for a maximum of seven years each.84 This is quite a large number of 
judges for such a small community of states and possibly adds to greater expenses 
when the court is in session. However, a remarkable fact is that the amendment of 
the EAC Treaty in 2006 created a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division 
composed of ten and five judges respectively.85  
The decisions of the EACJ relating to the interpretation and application of the EAC 
Treaty have precedence over those of national courts.86 Partner states may request 
advisory opinions from the EACJ; likewise the EAC Council.87 While the EAC first sat 
in 2001, it still has neither a permanent seat nor sitting. The court only sits when the 
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need to do so arises. The temporary seat of the court is in Arusha, Tanzania, but 
other sittings have been held in Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Kampala.88 Such a 
scenario raises pertinent questions relating to the envisaged TFTA Dispute 
Settlement Body as partners will have to decide on a strategic location for their court. 
Following the decision in Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney 
General of Kenya and Others,89 the jurisdiction of the court was expanded to include 
an appeal from a national division. In the Nyong’o case, the court decided that, 
despite having no locus standi, the citizens of Kenya could challenge the 
appointment of the Kenyan representatives to the East African Parliament. The EAC 
Council reacted to this decision by calling for amendments to the Court’s power, 
resulting in the 2006 Amendments.90 This in turn spurred calls for the EACJ to allow 
appeals from national courts in order to strengthen judiciaries within the region and 
harmonise the judicial systems of the partners and the EAC.91 A move to harmonise 
the laws of the TFTA member states would be a cumbersome process, especially if 
pitched at the level that the EAC wants to achieve. A less onerous but equally 
challenging move would be the harmonisation of trade and investment policies. That 
way, a TFTA-wide trade agenda could be sculpted as against external trade 
partners. 
Subsequent to the 2006 Amendments, the East African Law Society levelled a 
challenge against the EAC Council based on the legality of the ratification 
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procedures that were employed for the amendments.92 The EACJ concluded that the 
ratification process that was used in making the amendments constituted an 
infringement of the amendment rules in the Treaty because the private sector and 
civil society were not consulted during the drafting of the amendments. However, the 
court cautioned that despite the lack of procedurally sound enactment, the 
amendments were in line with the Treaty’s objectives.  
In James Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary General of the East African 
Community and Another,93 the court dealt with the lawfulness of the detention of 
Ugandan prisoners charged with treason. Jurisdiction of the court over human rights 
matters was challenged by the respondents, who contended that no such jurisdiction 
had been granted in terms of the EAC Treaty. The court held that despite this 
limitation on its power, the dispute fell under EAC law; hence a decision could be 
made. The extension of the court’s authority into the realm of human rights went 
beyond the ordinary scope of the EACJ’s work. However, it highlights the 
progressive nature of the court’s decision-making, which fact could be useful in 
encouraging a more independent role for the TFTA tribunal. This is a direct contrast 
to the political interference occasioned in the Nyong’o case. Nonetheless, the test of 
the continued independence of the court still remains to be seen. Ground-breaking 
judgments tend to aggravate state parties. 
(c) The SADC Tribunal 
The SADC Trade Protocol is the primary determinant of the SADC economic 
agenda. Its objectives include: liberalisation of trade; ensuring efficient production 
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within SADC; improving the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign 
investment; enhancing of economic development, diversification and 
industrialisation; and, establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008.94 The intended 
FTA was launched at the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in August 
2008. 
The SADC Tribunal was established to interpret the provisions of the SADC Treaty 
and to adjudicate on any disputes arising out of its provisions and those of subsidiary 
instruments.95 The Tribunal was made up of ten members of high judicial standing in 
their countries of origin, appointed for a five-year term renewable for the same period 
upon expiry if the first term.96 Five of these were regular members, while the others 
acted as a pool from which substitutes for regular members who were unable to 
execute their duties could be drawn.97 The Tribunal could be constituted by three 
judges.98 It only sat when cases were submitted to it.99 Such a model for the 
appointment and service of judges would be a convenient solution for cases where 
time and resource constraints arise, leading to delays in the judicial process.  
According to the SADC Treaty, the Tribunal could give advisory opinions at the 
request of the SADC Summit or Council.100 The Tribunal had jurisdiction over 
disputes between states,101 disputes between legal and natural persons and 
states,102 disputes between states and the community,103 and disputes involving the 
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Tribunal and its employees.104 However, it is notable that the Tribunal did not have 
original jurisdiction, unlike the EACJ. Disputes could only be referred to the Tribunal 
upon the exhaustion of local remedies.105  
The decisions of the Tribunal were deemed to be final and binding.106 This is 
remarkable in that the Tribunal was further directed to develop its own case law with 
due regard to general principles of international law.107 Such a ground-breaking 
directive was good in that it allowed the court to create its own precedents and 
develop community law in such a way that progressive justice could be occasioned. 
However, this provision was also to prove to be the Achilles heel of the Tribunal 
through the challenge that arose in the cases relating to Zimbabwe’s land reform 
programme.  
In Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and 78 Others v The Republic of Zimbabwe108the 
Tribunal heard a challenge by a group of displaced landowners to the land reform 
programme in Zimbabwe. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe decided that 
Amendment 17 of the Zimbabwe Constitution barring appeal to a court to challenge 
the acquisition of land by the state was in line with government policy regarding land 
reform.109 Since domestic jurisdiction of the courts had been ousted, the Tribunal 
determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter. Counsel for the Government of 
Zimbabwe alleged that the Tribunal had no proper basis for jurisdiction since this 
was a human rights issue, for which there was no provision in either the SADC 
Treaty or the Protocol on the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that it was 
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mandated to develop its own case law with due regard for the principles of 
international law. In addition, the SADC Treaty called on member states to act in 
accordance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law.110 Consequently, the 
Tribunal could hear the matter and make a determination on the merits.  
The Tribunal decided that the applicants had been discriminated against on the 
ground of race; hence the Zimbabwean government owed them fair compensation 
for their land. Zimbabwe challenged this conclusion on two bases: that it had not 
ratified the Protocol on the Tribunal and that the Tribunal did not formally exist since 
the SADC Summit had not determined it. Article 16 of the SADC Treaty states that 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 22, which provides that each Protocol is 
binding on members who have acceded to it; the Protocol on the Tribunal forms an 
integral part of the Treaty.111 This means that the ratification argument is 
unsustainable since accession to the Protocol is not the only way in which states can 
be bound by it. Furthermore, the fact that Zimbabwe nominated Justice Antonia 
Guvava to the Tribunal collapses the contention that Zimbabwe did not believe the 
Tribunal was in existence.112 This argument may have been sustained only if 
Zimbabwe had not acquiesced to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction through defending the 
matter in Windhoek. Even so, the appointment of a member of the Tribunal was 
testimony to the fact that Zimbabwe recognised its existence.  
Following the failure of the Zimbabwean government to comply with the decision of 
the Tribunal, a declaration regarding this breach was made in June 2009 and 
reported it to the Summit.113 Despite this move, however, a further case relating to 
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the land reform programme was heard by the Tribunal in 2010.114 In the latter case, 
the Tribunal found that there were further acts of non-compliance.  
One of the applicants in the Campbell case tried to have the order of the Tribunal 
enforced in Zimbabwe.115 The court reaffirmed the decision in Mike Campbell (Pty) 
Ltd. v Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement barring appeal to a court regarding forcible expropriation of land by the 
government in pursuit of its land reform agenda. It was reiterated that the land reform 
‘programme, despite its administrative and practical shortcomings, is quintessentially 
a matter of public policy in Zimbabwe, conceived well before the country attained its 
sovereign independence.’116 It is interesting that the court averred to the discordant 
manner in which the land reform programme had been implemented, yet chose to 
dismiss the Gramara appeal. While bowing to the dictates of the doctrine of 
separation of powers is commendable, the decision of the court not to challenge the 
executive highlights the tensions that exist between judicial orders made at regional 
level and the call for execution at domestic level.  
However, the decisions of South African courts to allow the enforcement of the 
Tribunal’s decision in South Africa added a new dimension to SADC community law, 
that is, the enforcement of Tribunal decisions through national courts of member 
states.117 This is pursuant to Article 32 of the Protocol on the Tribunal, which 
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provides, inter alia, that member states shall take measures to ensure execution of 
the decisions of the Tribunal.  
The Zimbabwean government held SADC at ransom by refusing to participate in any 
proceedings involving the Tribunal until the Protocol on the Tribunal was ratified by 
at least ten of the fifteen SADC states.118 Subsequently, the SADC Summit 
announced a review of the terms of reference of the Tribunal by the World Trade 
Institute Advisors in August 2010 and thereby a suspension of the Tribunal.119 The 
suspension was extended in May 2011, as well as in August 2012. At the latter 
Summit, it was decided that a new Protocol be negotiated to restrict individual 
access to the court and limit its jurisdiction.120  ‘SADC governments for the most part 
sat idly by, seemingly pleased to let Zimbabwe take the lead in destroying a judicial 
body that could one day issue decisions against them as well.’121 Up until its demise, 
the SADC Tribunal heard 15 cases, most of which involved disputes with its 
employees. Only one trade-related case ever came before the court – a case 
involving trade facilitation measures adopted in the DRC; however, it was not heard 
because the application was made just before the suspension of the Tribunal.122 
What happened with the SADC Tribunal could set an example for the future of 
dispute settlement bodies in the EAC and COMESA, and, going forward, the 
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TFTA.123 Business people and individuals need to be aware of their rights and 
remedies within the Tripartite setup. A regional court is an important instrument in 
facilitating regional integration.124 It is important that RTA judiciaries be allowed to 
operate independently and efficiently without undue interference from political elites.  
(d) The Tripartite Dispute Settlement System 
The Tripartite Dispute Settlement System is housed under the auspices of Article 38 
of the Draft TFTA Agreement and Annex 13 of this Agreement. However, it must be 
noted that the Ministerial Committee on Trade and Customs shall also hold dispute 
settlement powers in relation to trade related matters in the TFTA.125 How and in 
what specific circumstances these powers will be exercised, however, is not 
specified. Article 38 favours the resolution of disputes through cooperation and 
consultation.126 Should dispute resolution under Article 38 fail, recourse shall be had 
to Annex 13 procedures.127 An interesting aspect of Article 38 is the provision 
granting supremacy of the Draft TFTA Agreement as against the Agreements of the 
three RECs involved in the formation of the TFTA.128 This means that the 
Agreements of the three RECs will continue to subsist. On the other hand, the nature 
of engagement between the three RECs and the TFTA is not entirely spelt out in the 
Draft TFTA Agreement, thus it remains to be seen what the practical implications of 
this provision entail.  
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In the three RECs, individuals and private organisations were allowed to the 
approach DSB after exhausting local remedies. However, the suspension of the 
SADC Tribunal has left this avenue open only to legal and natural persons in the 
EAC and COMESA. In the TFTA, as in the WTO, only states may file disputes with 
the DSB.129 Perhaps standing should be given to both natural and legal persons at 
the TFTA level given the nature of trade in Africa, as alluded to above. 
Similarities exist between the WTO dispute settlement system and that of the TFTA.  
Both systems envisage the resolution of disputes following a four stage process.130 
Consultation sand consultation periods are similar. During consultations, good 
offices, conciliation and mediation may be engaged in an attempt to resolve a 
conflict. Upon the failure of consultations to resolve a dispute, any of the parties to a 
dispute can request that a Panel be established to consider the matter. Submissions, 
arguments and rebuttals are made on paper; however, oral arguments may be 
invited.131 After a hearing, the Panel issue an interim report which is available for 
comment from the parties to the dispute, following which a Final Report with 
Recommendations will be issued.132 Arbitration is an option which can be used to 
avert the expense and time involved in adversarial dispute resolution. Clearly the 
WTO is followed in this dispute resolution process. 
Differences do, however, exist between the two bodies. Dispute settlement at the 
TFTA is concerned with a violation of TFTA law, while that at the WTO involves the 
covered agreements.133 At the WTO, requests for consultations are sent directly to 
the DSB, while at the TFTA, they are sent to the Chief Executive Officers of the three 
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RECs.134 This provision seems rather strange and onerous in light of the fact that the 
relations between the REC-level dispute settlement bodies and that of the TFTA are 
not clearly spelt out. Hence it may be easier for aggrieved parties to submit requests 
directly to the TFTA dispute settlement body. The WTO provides for special 
procedures for developing countries, while the TFTA is mostly made up of 
developing countries, hence making it difficult to apply differential treatment. The 
Draft TFTA Agreement makes no mention of a Secretariat as one of the institutions, 
but it suddenly crops up in the DSU to exercise “functions and duties in support of 
this Annex.”135 What the nature of these duties is is unclear. Conversely, the WTO 
Secretariat assists with legal, historical and procedural aspects of dispute 
resolution136.  
VII CONCLUSION 
The advent of the TFTA will go a long way towards achieving the dream of an 
African Economic Community. However, prior to that, a number of issues need to be 
resolved first. Some states which form part of the three RECs are not part of the 
TFTA negotiations - for instance - Angola; hence it will be difficult to reach mutually 
viable solutions. The fact that not all states are participating fully in existing RECs as 
well as the TFTA negotiations also militates against proper regional integration. 
Some member states which will join the TFTA are not members of the WTO, hence 
the application of WTO law versus TFTA law will prove to be quite bothersome. The 
disparity in economic development, as well as trade relations, may contribute to 
trade animosity amongst states.  
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The need for an appropriate, effective dispute resolution mechanism could not be 
more pronounced given the challenges that are faced by the TFTA negotiating 
parties. Valuable lessons can be learnt in the dispute resolution realm of the existing 
RECs.  It is hoped that the TFTA partners will be able to arrive at mutually agreeable 
solutions following effective dispute resolution procedures. Being a new court, 
however, the TFTA mechanism will likely take a while to get off the ground and be 
deemed credible. Thus it would be expedient to choose cases that are not overly 
contentious, although this in some way curtails the carriage of justice. This is 
especially in light of the contentious cases involving Zimbabwe which in some way 
contributed to the demise of the SADC Tribunal.  
A rules-based approach allows even weaker states to experience somewhat the 
same equality and participation at the multilateral level. Indeed, for the rules to be 
deemed to have an effect and acquire the respect and recognition they deserve, 
enforcement should be seen to not only be possible, but also effective. Use of the 
reverse consensus method to adopt Panel reports as in the WTO would go a long 
way in ensuring speedy resolution of disputes. A secretariat may have to be 
established to assist the dispute settlement body in executing its mandate. 
Given the fact that Africa has a large informal business sector, allowing individuals to 
approach the tribunals for the redress of international trade disputes would be a 
positive step. It would be ideal as well to incorporate the exhaustion of local 
remedies in the TFTA prior to instituting proceedings at the regional level. Allowing 
appeals from national courts in order to strengthen judiciaries within the region and 
harmonise the judicial systems of the partners may also be a useful strategy to 
bolster the TFTA. This would be instrumental for the TFTA if decisions can be 
implemented at all levels, more so in national courts. A further dimension to this is 
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that such a decision results in states holding each other accountable. By the same 
token, this could see Zimbabwe enforcing a decision against Zambia in its courts. 
Consequently, member states will be unable to easily escape liability or be in 
contempt of court if enforcement is universalised.   
The establishment of an appeal court in the TFTA would allow for greater 
independence of the judicial body in charge of trade dispute settlement. If support for 
such a move can be garnered, then the problems associated with the lack of political 
will to enforce or implement decisions could be avoided. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that the balance between the sovereign integrity of states (a very important 
component of the political reality facing African countries) and the separation of 
powers in the super-regional institution is delicate. Many of the states involved in the 
formation of the TFTA are likely not interested in an extensive limit on their 
sovereignty. At the same time, an appeal court which binds all national courts could 
in fact thwart the regional integration initiative if not carefully managed. However, it is 
important that this be kept in mind going forward.  
The parties will have to decide whether to have a permanent seat for the court. It has 
to be strategically located to ensure that states wishing to utilise dispute settlement 
procedures are not unduly burdened, given the vast area which the TFTA occupies. 
Whether sittings of the judges are held will also depend on the case load which will 
come before the court. The SADC model of five sitting and five stand-by judges; in 
addition to the directive for the Tribunal to develop its own case law can be drawn 
from for guidance. Such appointment and service of judges would be a convenient 
solution for cases where time and resource constraints arise, leading to delays in the 
judicial process. This is a compromise which allows for expeditious hearing of cases 
while ensuring that the pool of judges can be called upon to hear cases. Allowing the 
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court to create its own precedents and develop community law independently will 
ensure that progressive justice is occasioned.  
The Nyong’o decision led to the amendment of the EAC Treaty relating to the power 
of the EACJ. SADC Heads of State also suspended the Tribunal after it was deemed 
to have over-stepped its mandate. The suspension of the Tribunal has major 
implications for the future of the TFTA since COMESA and the EAC have functional 
regional courts. The envisaged trade benefits emanating from the formation of the 
large trade bloc stand to be torpedoed should a trade dispute settlement mechanism 
not be properly framed. Such political interference in judicial decision-making may 
serve to curtail the powers of the court; hence the Tripartite parties should beware 
such intrusion and attempt to adhere to the separation of powers.  
Admittedly, during the negotiation stage of the TFTA, issues of trade dispute 
settlement are unlikely to hold the fort for some time. However, it is important for 
negotiators to bear in mind that the trade rules under discussion will require 
interpretation and application, thus the significance of clear dispute settlement 
procedures cannot be gainsaid. Whilst state sovereignty and national policy should 
be respected, any action which impacts negatively on the future Tripartite Dispute 
Settlement Body - and thereby the regional economic bloc – should be dealt a heavy 
blow to guard against the demise of an intra-regional court. 
While the establishment of a rules-based mechanism is laudable, policies and 
training on the ground need to be formulated to support the institutional apparatus.  It 
is not enough to only have institutions; their effective running requires a lot more 
than just institutional structures. The political will to ensure that decisions are carried 
forward and implemented effectively in line with the overall goals of the TFTA is 
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essential in guaranteeing the continued existence and respect for the dispute 
settlement body. Educational initiatives may also be necessary to allow TFTA 
officials to empower those involved in trade processes people regarding the avenues 
for redress available to them in the TFTA. The peaceful settlement of disputes is an 
important contributor to the success of the judicial body which will be inaugurated. In 
this way, the regional court can play a big role in fostering confidence in the viability 
of regional integration initiatives as well as allowing disgruntled parties the 
opportunity to seek redress where conflicts have arisen.  
 
